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Abstract
Expert elicitation is a process for eliciting subjective probability distributions from experts about items of interest
to decision makers. These methods have been increasingly applied in the energy domain to collect information on
the future cost and performance of specific energy technologies and the associated uncertainty. This article
reviews the existing expert elicitations on energy technologies with three main objectives: (1) to provide insights
on expert elicitation methods and how they compare/complement other approaches to inform public energy
decision making; (2) to review all recent elicitation exercises about future technology costs; and (3) to discuss the
main results from these expert elicitations, in terms of implied rates of cost reduction and the role of R&D
investments in shaping these reductions, and compare it with insights from backward looking approaches. We
argue that the emergence of data on future energy costs through expert elicitations provides the opportunity for
more transparent and robust analyses incorporating technical uncertainty to assess energy and climate change
mitigation policies.
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1. Introduction
When making decisions about energy systems, policy makers need to consider several aspects. First, fossil-fuel
technologies give rise to a negative environmental externality due to the pollution they produce.1 Since pollution
is not always priced, private incentives for RD&D in low-carbon technologies have been low with respect to the
societal need for such investments (Popp 2010). Second, in research, development and demonstration (RD&D)
there is significant uncertainty associated with the returns and much of the value is associated with low
probability but high value outcomes (Scherer and Harhoff 2000). Such uncertainty may be particularly large in the
case of energy: energy systems and investments are long-lived and are embedded in costly infrastructures that
make it hard for new technologies to compete (Unruh 2000). Third, parts of the energy sector, such as electricity
provision, are characterized by high government regulation, which often prevents utilities from directly investing
in RD&D (Walker 2000). Hence, the general under-provision of (RD&D) effort from the private sector due to the
presence of market failures is even more acute in the case of energy technologies, since environmental market
failures compound the problem and the negative role of uncertainty may prove particularly problematic in the
energy domain (Popp 2010, Popp et al. 2010). Finally, there are concerns regarding energy security, access and
safety.
These reasons provide strong grounds to justify government investments in clean energy RD&D to meet
environmental, security and competitiveness goals. One of the pressing needs of public decision makers is to
design cost-effective and robust portfolios of public energy technology RD&D investments. Such portfolios should
allocate funding across the sometimes complementary, sometimes competing energy technologies in a way that
accounts for their societal benefits and for the uncertainties inherent to technology innovation. Environmental
policies encompass technology-neutral policies in terms of innovation and deployment (for instance, this is the
case for carbon taxes) or more technology-specific policies, such as wind feed-in-tariffs, and provide incentives to
private firms to focus on those technologies that are closer to the market. RD&D policies should on the other
hand be designed to address RD&D needs to meet the long-run climate and energy objectives and concerns.
Governments may in fact want to be strategic in selecting which broad category of energy technologies to fund
through RD&D allocations to ensure the development of technologies which are cost-effective in the long run or
have a large option value, even though they may raise costs in the short run (Popp 2010).
But how can governments design energy technology RD&D portfolios that are robust to both the uncertainty
surrounding the development of energy technology and the uncertainty surrounding climate or (more broadly)
energy policies? What methods can be used to quantify such uncertainty in order to inform the decision-making
process?
One way to inform policy decisions is learning from experience, studying the development of a particular
technology (or similar technologies) in the past, and whether and how government RD&D spending shaped its
evolution. The history of government involvement in energy RD&D provides several examples (Keller and Block
2008). Recent research suggests that governments have played major roles as investors in RD&D in high risk
areas, including climate-friendly research (Mazzucato 2013). Econometric analysis of past trends in energy
technologies has also been used to predict future trajectories, for instance in the learning or experience curve
literature (Wiesenthal et al. 2012a; Nagy et al. 2013; Bettencourt et al. 2013), or in the extensive literature looking
at the determinants of energy innovation (Popp et al 2010). However, estimating the uncertainty around future
technology cost and performance from past data and experiences does not reflect the fact that RD&D is, by its
1

The U.S. National Research Council estimated that the “external costs” of energy conversion in the United States totaled
over $120 billion in 2005, noting that many additional external costs were not quantifiable (NRC, 2010).
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nature, uncertain and that different technologies may evolve differently at different points in time. Past trends
may not correctly predict the future evolution of costs and performance and are unlikely to differentiate between
different technologies and funding amounts (NRC 2007, Baker et al 2009a; Chan et al. 2011, Anadón et al. 2014b).
A second, complementary, process to inform public decisions on energy technology RD&D funding is that of
expert elicitations, which entail collecting experts’ views on the future evolution of a technology and how
government funding might facilitate it. Expert elicitations are structured processes for eliciting subjective
probability distributions from scientists, engineers, and other analysts who are knowledgeable about the metrics
of interest (Morgan and Henrion 1990), in this case the costs and performance of energy technologies. Expert
elicitations overcome the limitations associated with learning or experience curves by drawing on the best
available information (which may not yet be codified in the literature) and relaxing the assumption that the
previous technological trajectory will continue (Chan et al. 2011). Furthermore, expert elicitations can be used to
identify the most important technological and non-technological bottlenecks. Over the past 8 years, various
research groups carried out structured expert elicitations on several energy technologies. Some of these groups
had an explicit objective to inform RD&D investment decisions and thus included specific questions about the
outcomes of different levels of RD&D investments.
This article reviews the existing expert elicitations on energy technologies with three main objectives: (1) provide
insights on expert elicitation methods and how they compare/complement other approaches to inform public
energy decision making; (2) to review all recent elicitation exercises about future technology costs; and (3) to
discuss main results from these expert elicitations, in terms of future technology costs and implied cost reduction
rates.
In Section 2 we introduce the reader to the basics of expert elicitations, providing some background on their
applications and potential limitations. Section 3 discusses and compares results for a subset of studies and
technologies, while Section 4 concludes.

2. Expert elicitation methods applied to energy technology
2.1 What is an expert elicitation
Expert elicitation, as we will use the term, is a process for eliciting subjective probability distributions from
experts about items of interest to decision makers (Hora and Von Winterfeldt 1997). These methods were
pioneered in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly in applications concerning decisions in the face of extreme events
(Howard et al 1972; North et al 1975). While most applications of expert elicitation have taken place in the
private sector (Morgan 2014), they are increasingly used to inform policy making, particularly in areas related to
the environment and health (Peerenboom et al 1989; Hora and Von Winterfeldt 1997; Krayer von Krauss et al
2004; Cooke et al. 2007; Roman et al. 2008; InterAcademy Council 2010; Zickfeld et al 2010; Morgan 2014; EC
2015; US EPA 2015). A detailed review of existing studies in environmental policy applications is provided in the
companion paper in this symposium [Cooke, 2016, this journal]. While elicitations were first envisioned as a way
to collect existing knowledge stored in the heads of experts, it was later realized that the process helps experts
develop probability distributions that represent their knowledge (Morgan and Henrion 1990; Hora 2007).
In this paper we focus on expert elicitations in the energy domain, which focus on the future cost and
performance of specific energy technologies and, crucially, the associated uncertainty.
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2.2 Challenges in expert elicitation design and use
The main challenge of expert elicitation is that it relies on individuals who are experts in the field under
investigation but not necessarily proficient at expressing themselves in terms of probability (Winkler 1967).
Experts, like most people, are subject to common biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), including anchoring,
status quo trap, framing, overconfidence, base-rate trap, and motivational bias (Hammond et al 1999). Protocols
and methodologies for structured expert elicitations were developed to reduce these biases (Morgan and Henrion
1990). The vast literature on this topic point to two sets of critical issues in designing and using an expert
elicitation: how to properly design the elicitation protocol to reduce expert biases as much as possible (Hora
2007; O’Hagan et al. 2006a) and how to present and analyze the data collected, with a focus on different
aggregation methods (Clemen and Winkler 1999, Hora et al. 2013, Lichtendahl et al 2013, Baker and Olaleye
2013).
The assessment of the quality of the information resulting from specific expert elicitations is very difficult. The
main reason is that subjective probabilities reflect an individual’s degree of belief: unless a probability is 1 or 0, it
is impossible to say that it is “right” or “wrong”. It is possible, however, (at least in theory) to evaluate the
calibration or precision of experts on particular questions for which the answer is known, in a process of external
validation. An expert is well calibrated on a particular set of questions if about p% of the events to which he
assigns p% probability, are known to actually occur. This reasoning can be extended to intervals as well. It is most
typical for people to be poorly calibrated by being overconfident.
Experts are overconfident if their stated probability intervals are too narrow, leading the realized values to fall
outside of the intervals more frequently than they should. For example, Capen (1976) found, in a large scale
experiment using almanac questions, that approximately 68% of the true values fell outside intervals provided by
experts, regardless of what probability range participants were asked for.
Furthermore, an expert may be well calibrated but imprecise. For example, an expert who gives the long term
average probability of rain to predict the probability of rain on a particular day would be perfectly calibrated, but
poorly resolved, and therefore not very useful. The combination of calibration and precision can be evaluated (expost) using Proper Scoring Rules (Bickel 2007) in experimental settings, an approach which has led to
improvements in protocol design. In addition, the use of scoring rules provides an important feedback to experts,
a feedback which is crucial for improvement.
Regarding the analysis and presentation of the data from expert elicitations, a controversial question is whether
and how to aggregate the information provided by different experts. Morgan (2014) argues that expert
distributions should not be aggregated at all, but simply presented to decision makers to more accurately
represent the wide diversity of views. This has the advantage of allowing decision makers to see, and possibly
understand, the range of disagreement about key parameters. The downside is that the decision makers are left
to aggregate the set of views themselves, which is challenging and vulnerable to bias (Cooke 2015; Bolger and
Rowe 2015). One approach to support decision making in cases like this is to apply what are called “bottom up
exploratory” methods, such as Robust Decision Making (Lempert and Collins 2007), Decision Scaling (Brown et al
2012), and Info Gap (Ben-Haim 2004). Each of these methods analyze alternative actions or policy decisions and
visually represent how they perform under the full set of alternative beliefs, with a focus on generating new,
more robust alternatives. Kalra et al (2014) discuss how these types of models can help lead to agreement over
decisions in the policy realm. Related to this, Baker et al (2016) introduce a new technique that identifies sets of
alternatives that are non-dominated across all expert beliefs. These sets of alternatives can then be used in
conjunction with the bottom up methods.
4

An emerging literature argues in favor of aggregating expert judgments in the context of a specific decision
problem through the use of non-traditional decision rules. For example, there are a number of papers applying
Ambiguity Aversion frameworks to the climate change problem (Athanassoglou and Bosetti 2015; Millner et al.
2013; Heal and Millner 2014, Berger et al 2015). A similar approach is Robust Optimization (Gabrel et al 2014,
Bertsimas et al 2011; Mortazavi-Naeini 2015). All of these approaches use a version of worst-case analysis,
identifying an alternative that does not perform too badly in the worst case.
The traditional approach is to mathematically or behaviorally aggregate expert views. While there is little
agreement on which method is best, Clemen and Winkler (1999) conclude that “simple combination rules (e.g., a
simple average) tend to perform quite well” and that “more complex rules sometimes outperform the simple
rules, but they can be somewhat sensitive, leading to poor performance in some instances.” Recent work
indicates that other mathematical aggregation methods, such as by median or quantiles, may have some
attractive properties (Hora et al. 2013; Lichtendahl et al 2013).
As discussed in [Cooke 2016, this journal] evaluating elicitation responses from experts through a set of seed
questions can play an important role in the aggregation phase by providing weightings to apply to expert answers.
Regarding energy technologies, seed questions might cover topics such as the level and composition of current
costs trends and drivers of performance improvements in the past. These questions could be designed to have a
known correct answer, allowing researchers to evaluate experts’ calibrations to those questions. However, it is
not clear whether the ability to accurately answer short term questions is a good proxy for the ability to
accurately estimate the distributions of costs and performance 20 years in the future. Given this challenge, a
fruitful direction for future research would be to perform experiments similar to those described in [Cooke 2016,
this journal], but using elicitations with answers that will be realized some decades into the future.

2.3 Energy technology expert elicitations: process and characteristics
Expert elicitations are typically codified in a protocol, which includes a set of steps (see, e.g., Kotra et al. 1996;
Budnitz et al. 1997; Cooke and Goossens 2000; O’Hagan et al. 2006; Meyer and Booker 1991; Jenni and van Luik
2010 for an overview). Below we discuss each of these steps and how they differ across a set of existing energy
technology elicitations, which were performed between 2007 and 2014.
Table 1 lists the studies, organized by technology, along with some key characteristics. We also summarize the
results of three meta-analyses which study how design and expert characteristics affect elicited estimates
(Anadón et al 2013; Verdolini et al. 2015; Nemet et al. 2016 – AVN hereafter. A more detailed summary is
included in Appendix B).

Table 1: Overview of Expert Elicitations on energy technologies.
Research Group, Source/Publication

Experts (#,
characteristics)

Year Of
Elicitation

Target
year

Type of question

RD&D scenarios
(see Table 3)

Elicitation
Mode

Bioelectricity
UMass*

5

2007

2050

Probabilities

yes

Baker et al. (2008a)

4 (academia,
government,
private sector)

F2F, mail,
phone

Harvard*

7 (academia,

2010

2030

Percentile

yes

Mail & phone

Anadón et al. (2011); Anadón, et al.
(2014a)
FEEM*
Fiorese et al. (2014)

private sector)

16 (academia,
government,
private sector)

(medians for some
metrics)

2011

2030

Percentiles and
Probabilities

yes

F2F

Biofuel
UMass*
Baker and Keisler (2011)

6 (academia,
government)

2008

2050

Probabilities

yes

F2F, mail,
phone

8 (academia,
private sector)

2010

2030

Percentile
(medians for some
metrics)

yes

Mail & phone

15 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2011

2030

Percentiles and
Probabilities

yes

F2F

Harvard*
Anadón et al. (2011); Anadón, et al.
(2014a)
FEEM*
Fiorese et al. (2013)

CCS
UMass
Baker et al. (2009b)
Harvard*
Chan et al. (2011) *
Duke
Chung et al (2011)
UMass
Jenni et al (2013)
FEEM
Ricci et al. (2014)
CMU
Rao et al. (2006)
NRC
(NRC 2007)

4 (academia,
government)

2007

2050

Probabilities

yes

F2F & survey

13 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2010

2030

Percentiles and
Probabilities

yes

F2F & survey

13 (private sector,
government)

2011

2030

Percentiles

no

Survey & F2F
or phone

15 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2011

2025

Percentiles

yes

F2F

12 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2012

2030

Percentiles

yes

online

12 (academia,
private sector)

2006

2030,
2050

Percentiles

yes

F2F

12 (academia,
private sector)

2006

2022

Probabilities

yes

F2F Panel

Probabilities

yes

F2F & mail

Nuclear
UMass*
Baker et al (2008b)

6

4 (academia,
government)

2007

2050

Harvard* and FEEM*
Anadón et al. (2012)
CMU (GEN III only)*
Abdulla et al (2013)

60 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2010

2030

Percentile
(medians for some
metrics)

yes

Online &
group
workshop

12 (government,
private sector)

2011

estimate
for an
NOAK plant

Probabilities &
percentiles

no, but consistent
with BAU

F2F

Solar
UMass
3 (Academic)

2007

2050

Probabilities

yes

F2F followed
by survey

11 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2010

2030

Percentile
(medians for some
metrics)

yes

Online

16 (academia,
government,
private sector,
academic

2011

2030

Probabilities &
percentiles

yes

F2F

21 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2011

Year for
deployment
target
defined by
expert

Percentiles

not specified

Online

18 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2008

2030;
2050

Probabilities

yes

Mail survey

Baker et al 2009a*
Harvard*
Anadón et al. (2011); Anadón, et al.
(2014a)
FEEM*

Bosetti et al. (2012) *

NearZero
Inman (2012)
CMU*
Curtright et al. (2008)

Vehicles
UMass
Baker et al. (2010)
FEEM
Catenacci et al. (2013)
Harvard
Anadón et al. (2011); Anadón, et al.
(2014a)

7 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2008

2050

Probabilities

yes

F2F & mail

14 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2012

2030

Percentiles &
proba-bilities

yes

F2F

9 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2011

2030

Percentile
(medians for some
metrics)

yes

Mail and F2F
for some

Other
Harvard - Utility scale energy storage
Anadón et al. (2011); Anadón, et al.
(2014a)
NRC – IGCC

7

25 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2011

2030

Percentile
(medians for some
metrics)

yes

Mail and F2F
for some

8

2006

2025

probabilities

yes

F2F Panel

NRC (2007)
Stanford-Natural Gas
Bistline (2013)

(academia,private
sector)

4 (government,
private sector)

2013??

2025

Cumulative
probabilities

yes

F2F

7 (private sector)

2010

2011

Percentiles

no

Phone

25 (academia,
government,
private sector)

2010

2030

Percentiles

no

F2F

GHG MI – Wind
Gillenwater (2013)
UCL -- Low Carbon Energy
Usher and Strachan (2013)

Note: The studies shaded in grey are those for which the original data could not be retrieved. * identifies the studies for which costs have
been standardized(see the online Appendix for process, Section 4 for results).

Define the Objective. The objective of most of the elicitations listed in Table 1 is to inform public energy
technology RD&D policy. The specific quantities that were elicited are metrics defining cost and other
technological performance parameters. In 80% of the studies the focus on RD&D was explicit, asking experts to
judge cost evolution conditional on RD&D budgets; in the remaining studies no mention of the RD&D funding is
made. Even within the former group of studies, objectives varied. For instance, the FEEM, Harvard and UMass
solar studies were developed specifically to support further modeling and portfolio analysis, whereas the CMU
solar PV study was designed to stand alone. This likely shaped the specific set of questions asked.
Select an Elicitation Mode. Elicitation mode refers to the way in which the expert judgments were collected: mail
or online surveys, or telephone or face-to-face (F2F) interviews. Until recently, most elicitations were carried out
as F2F interviews, generally assumed to be the gold standard (Meyer and Booker 1991; O’Hagan et al. 2006), since
it allows for targeted “debiasing” and follow-up questions. Recently, however, many groups have been moving
toward other modes including interactive mail and online surveys complemented with follow-up interactions with
researchers (Nordhaus 1994; Curtright et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2011; Anadón et al. 2012). There has been work in
developing interactive online tools for supporting expert elicitation (James et al 2010; Spaccasassi and Deleris
2011; Speirs-Bridge et al. 2010; Shearer et al. 2014; Dalal et al. 2011; Anadón et al. 2012), motivated primarily by
concerns of expense and scope. There has been little research aimed at quantitatively evaluating the impact of
elicitation mode and expert selection. Recent non-controlled studies (Baker et al. 2014; AVN) found that Inperson surveys are associated with broader uncertainty ranges. This suggests that current online methods are not
as good as an interviewer in getting experts to think more broadly. Within the studies reviewed here, 42%
involved F2F elicitations with all experts; 72% included some F2F interactions; the remainder used remote modes,
including phone, internet, or mail.
Identify Experts. Selecting a highly qualified and diverse pool of experts can help avoid anchoring on the current
state of technology (see for instance Raiffa 1968; Keeney and Winterfeld 1991; Meyer and Booker 1991; Phillips
1999; Clemen and Reilly 2001;). There are often questions about the appropriate number of experts, however
ideas of statistical significance are not entirely appropriate. First, informed experts are necessarily correlated
since there is a limited set of literature and results on any technology. Second, the idea of expert elicitation is to
derive a representation of the views of the community of experts; it is not a draw from some kind of underlying
existing probability distribution. Some studies have found that there are diminishing marginal returns to
additional experts after as few as 3 or 4 (Clemen and Winkler 1985; Ferrell 1985; Clemen and Winkler 1999;
8

Clemen and Winkler 2007), but the optimal number is not set and may depend on the technology area and type
of questions. One study (US EPA, 2015) reviewed 38 expert elicitation studies: 90% used fewer than 12 experts,
and 60% had six to eight experts. The studies reviewed in this article vary on the number of experts assessed,
from 3 to 60. On average, they are a bit larger than typical studies, with an average of 11.5, and only 44% having
fewer than 12. Just over half the studies had at least one participant each from Academia, Government, and the
Private Sector. Diversity is important: experts in different technology areas, sectors or regions may have different
experiences, impacting their estimates (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Confirming this, AVN find that expert
background and geographic location are often associated with lower or higher cost estimates, but this effect is
technology specific and cannot be generalized. This likely reflects the experience of experts with a given
technology.
Structure the elicitation. This is typically done in conjunction with a subset of the experts and includes the
definition of the uncertain quantity to be assessed (metrics in a given target year for specific technologies) and
the conditioning variables, the way in which uncertainty will be encoded, consistency checks, and possibly
assessment and self-assessment of experts.
Metrics. The metrics refer to the specific quantity that experts are asked to assess. The definition of the uncertain
quantity must pass “the clarity test” (Howard 1988): there must be a clear quantity that can be universally agreed
upon once the event of interest has taken place. The studies covered here vary in the degree of aggregation in the
metrics they assess, ranging from very specific technical metrics such as “sorbent concentration” for Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS), through aggregated characteristics of technologies such as capital cost and efficiency,
to highly aggregated cost metrics such as LCOE of a specific technology. There are tradeoffs inherent in the choice
of metric. Disaggregated metrics require a great deal of time to assess, and may be less intuitive for experts.
Aggregated cost metrics have one foot in technological understanding and one foot in economics, making them
useful. However, experts who deeply understand the technology and experts who understand economic
interactions may not be the same.
Target Year. This refers to the year for which the parameters are being estimated, and ranges between 2022 and
2050, with some studies (Harvard, CMU-Curtright) including two different time points (2010 and 2030).
Technologies covered. Some studies assess a single specific technology category (say, small modular reactors).
Other studies asked separate questions about different technologies within a technology area (say, large scale
Gen III/III+, large-scale Gen IV, and small modular reactors). Other studies aggregate the technologies in some
way, either by having experts assess only those specific technologies they believe will be most commercially
viable (e.g., enzymatic hydrolysis for biofuels), or by having the experts assess the future of an entire technology
class (i.e. CCS).
Conditioning variables. Analysts must define which conditions will be considered explicitly, and which will be
considered implicitly, leaving the experts to make judgments about them. Conditions of interest include
assumptions about future input prices, the characterization of government or private RD&D efforts to support the
specific technology, or any other key energy or environmental policy (e.g. a carbon tax) as well as assumptions
about the future state of the economy (for instance, business-as-usual conditions for economic growth).
The most important conditioning variable in these studies is the RD&D budget. Twenty-one studies specify
budgets explicitly, using a range of approaches. These include asking the experts to consider BAU budget
scenarios, to provide their own suggested RD&D investment level, or to condition on budget amounts predetermined by the research team. The ranges of budgets vary widely, with the UMass studies generally having the
smallest budgets and Harvard generally having the largest (see online Appendix for more details).
9

Five of the 26 studies do not specify a public RD&D budget: it is an implicit part of the expert assessment to think
about what future budgets may be and to average over all the possible futures. There is a tradeoff between fully
specifying external conditions (such as economic growth, trade policies, etc.) and ensuring that the burden on
experts’ time to participate is not too onerous.
Encoding Uncertainty. Assessing subjective probabilities can be done in two ways: assessing specific percentiles,
such as 5-50-95, or asking for probabilities of achieving a certain specified endpoint. Among these studies, 46%
used percentiles, 36% used probabilities, and 18% used both. Percentiles are easy to translate to probability
distributions and avoid anchoring the experts; but are prone to over-confidence, with experts often reporting
ranges that are too small compared to other experts and compared to experimental findings. Probabilities are less
prone to over-confidence (Juslin et al 1999), but may anchor experts, and may lead to a situation where only a
small portion of the probability distribution is assessed. The gold standard would be to use both methods.
However, the tradeoff is that with more methods for assessing values, fewer values can be assessed. For example,
the FEEM solar study used both, but the elicited metric was aggregated (LCOE), while the Harvard solar survey
elicited only percentiles, but focused on a finer level of detail (for instance, inverter costsmodule costs, etc.).
Assessment and Self-assessment of Experts. Some studies ask experts to assess their level of expertise in general
or specific technology areas. This has appeal, since it allows researchers to determine whether experts are
systematically favoring technologies they are most expert in (see for instance Anadón et al. 2014a and all
elicitations by FEEM). However, no relationship has been found between an expert’s self-assessment and the
assessments by that expert (Bolger and Rowe 2014). There is some evidence that there is value in asking seed
questions (questions whose exact answer will be known by the researcher) and then weighting experts by how
well they answer the seed questions (Cooke 1991; Lin and Cheng 2009). Only one of the studies considered here
used a test question, but it was on an unrelated subject, aimed at generally assessing experts’ overconfidence.
Train Experts. Providing experts with background information, training, and pretesting the survey before the full
implementation of the elicitation are key steps to reduce biases and errors.. Background information generally
includes previous cost estimates for different sub-technologies, a discussion about overconfidence and other
biases and how to reduce them, and data on previous RD&D budgets (see for instance the supplementary
information of Anadón et al. 2012). Pre-testing is done for most protocols, but often is not described in the
resulting published papers.
Perform Assessment. The expert elicitation is conducted with the full set of experts.
Analyze and Present Results. Elicitation data can be analyzed and reported in a number of ways as discussed
above. There is much current research on how to communicate uncertain data to final users (Spiegelhalter et al
2011), which has relevance to the presentation of expert elicitation results. The results of the studies reviewed
here are presented at various levels of aggregation.
In order to compare results of expert elicitations, it is necessary to standardize the data from the different studies
to some degree. In the remaining of this paper, we focus on the standardized cost estimates from four expert
elicitation groups (UMass, Harvard, FEEM and CMU) for five key technologies (bioelectricity, biofuel, CCS, nuclear
and solar). For details on the standardization, see the online Appendix as well as AVN and Baker et al. (2015a).
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3. Cost-estimates and the impact of RD&D from energy technology
expert elicitation
First, we turn to what can be learned from backward looking studies on the impacts of RD&D. A number of
specific case studies conclude that public energy RD&D investments played a major role in cost and performance
improvements. This is the case, for instance, for the development of the GE High Efficiency Gas Turbine,
Nanosolar, Energy Efficient Appliances, LED lighting, 3D imaging and other shale gas recovery technologies (Keller
and Block 2008). DOE (2000) quantifies the benefits of 20 of its most successful energy efficiency and renewable
energy programs and finds they saved about 5.8EJ, equivalent to around 6 percent of US energy consumption in
2005. As pointed out in Anadón and Holdren (2010) “These energy savings were three times greater than the total
amount of funding for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) appropriated by DOE”. Similarly, NRC
(2001) found that six specific efficiency programs co-funded by the DOE and the private sector between 19782000 resulted in benefits of about $30 billion 2000$;2 whereas the amount spent by DOE on all energy efficiency
programs in that period was $7.3 billion. However, Anadón and Holdren (2010) point out that the fossil energy
returns “were modest in comparison, and they did not allow the … claim that those …programs had produced
enough … to cover the (investment) by DOE …”. Overall, understanding of the historic RD&D investments of both
the public and private sector is poor (see online Appendix for more details). This notwithstanding, there is
growing quantitative evidence supporting the notion that public support for RD&D increases innovation in energy
technologies as measured by patenting and results in lower technology costs in developed countries such as the
US, Japan, Denmark, Germany, and the UK (for instance, Howell 2015; Klaassen et al., 2005; Wiesenthal et al.
2012a). However, insights about the relative merits of different grant funding mechanisms, type of private sector
partnership, and extent of crowding in vs. out are still few. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no
quantitative evidence is yet available for countries outside the OECD.. Overall, the available backward looking
studies suggest that public RD&D investments in energy technologies give rise to significant returns.
Similarly, both a descriptive analysis of elicitation data and AVN provide strong indication that higher public RD&D
investment give rise to lower elicited costs, both at the median and at the extremes of the distribution. Returns to
RD&D investment differ significantly by technology reflecting different technological maturity and perceived costreduction options. Conversely, the level of public RD&D investment considered in expert elicitations does not
generally affect the uncertainty range of elicited costs.
We now turn to a comparison of the standardized cost with historical data from similar or related technologies
and present insights on the implied average annual rate from these data. Figure 1 summarizes the future
technology cost distributions (left panel) and the respective cost change rate (right panel).
On the left panel, (with the exception of the CCS data) the ends of the lines show the lowest 10th percentile and
the highest 90th percentile among all of the experts in each study, and the marker the median of the medians. For
CCS, each line shows the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the aggregated distributions from Baker et al 2015a; thus
these values are less extreme than the others.

2

The specific programs analyzed were: advanced refrigerator/freezer compressors, electronic ballast for fluorescent lamps,
low-emission glass, advanced lost foam casting, oxygen-fueled gas furnace, and advanced turbine systems.
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Figure 1: Summary of the elicitation data showing the cost-estimates from energy technology expert elicitations (left
panel) and the implied average annual rate of cost change (right panel).

th

Notes: For all technologies, with the exception of CCS, the horizontal lines range from the minimum of the 10 percentile to
th
the maximum of the 90 percentile across all experts in that particular study. The middle marker represents the median of
th
th
th
the medians. In the case of CCS we show the 10 , the 50 and the 90 percentiles of the joint distribution across experts. The
vertical red lines in the left-hand-side panels show the average price of the technologies in 2010 (See SI for further details).
The right-hand panels present the distribution of the annual rate of cost changes between 2010 and 2030 of elicited cost
distributions assuming the 2010 costs shown on the left panel. These are then plotted against the historical rates calculated
from data in the literature, represented by the shaded vertical colored areas. Both panels show results by R&D level scenario.
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While each study was translated into common units of $/kWh, the metrics for each technology vary somewhat.
The solar metric is the full LCOE, accounting for all costs (other than grid integration). This cost, was calculated
assuming a capacity factor of 12% (to be consistent with the implicit assumptions of the FEEM study); the costs
would be about 35% lower if the the capacity factor were 18.5% instead. Both bioenergy metrics are levelized
non-energy cost (thus excluide fuel costs), which may vary between $1-2/GGE or $.03-.06/kWh. The nuclear
metric is levelized capital cost (thus exclude O&M, fuel cost, or waste storage), which currently are around
$.024/kWh (NEI 2016). The CCS metric is levelized additional capital cost. It does not account for the energy
penalty from CCS, and would need to be added to the levelized cost of fossil generation to get the full cost of
electricity.
For comparison, the vertical red lines in the left-hand-side panel show the average of the 2010 costs (see
Appendix D for detail on sources). It may appear surprising that some of the 2030 costs provided by experts are
higher than the 2010 values. However, the line shows only the average of 2010 costs, rather than an entire cost
distribution; the elicited Harvard distributions for 2010, for example, were wide, consistent with data from IRENA.
Overall, insights from the left-hand panel indicate that most of the technologies are expected to improve, in the
sense that the medians, along with a large part of the future cost distribution, are lower than the 2010 cost.
However, the median of the nuclear cost is estimated to remain close to the 2010 average cost, and there are
many 90th percentiles that are above current costs. The average impact of additional R&D expenditures tends to
be small relative to the entire range of uncertainty. The value of these elicitation results, however, does not rest
simply in the medians, but in the full range of uncertainty.
The right-hand-side panel of Figure 1 compares historical average annual rates of change from several sources in
the literature with the implied average annual rate from the relevant expert elicitations. For both the historical
data and the elicitations, the average annual rate of cost change was calculated as follows:

Where t0 is the starting year and t1 the final year of the interval considered, and Costt0 and Costt1 are the relevant
cost at those two years. The rates are highly dependent on the choice of t0 and t1 (Nemet 2009); thus we show
multiple ranges when they exist. We report the linear average rate of change for the historical data and the
elicitations instead of a non-linear function that would be more consistent with historical experience for two
reasons. First, most elicitation studies only asked experts about future costs for one date (mainly in 2030). The
lack of intermediate points makes it impossible to estimate the two parameters needed for a non-linear fit
consistent with Moore’s law (Nagy et al. 2013). Second, linear averages are easier to interpret than the two
parameters resulting from a non-linear fit. For example, the right panel from Figure 2 can be interpreted by
seeing that historical costs and future-looking elicitations lead to the ranges shown in terms of X% decrease in
costs per year on average. In Appendix E we show that the ranking across technologies regarding the historical
rate of change over time does not change if we estimate the parameters for Moore’s law..
Note that the analogies that were used for the historical comparisons were more similar for some technologies
than for others. The historical rates of bioelectricity represent the change in capital cost of biomass fluidized-bed
combined heat and power in Sweden between 1990 and 2002. The historical range shown for biofuels represents
the cost evolution of sugarcane ethanol in Brazil from the periods of 1980-1985 (slower rate of decrease) and for
1985 and 2002 (faster rate of decrease) (Goldemberg et al 2004). The expert elicitation exercise covered other
processes, such as second generation cellulosic technologies. We did not identify a good historical analogue for
the additional capital cost of CCS. W show two estimates of the evolution of the capital cost of nuclear power in
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France between 1977-2002 and 1977-2002 from Gruebler (2010) and Escobar Rangel and Lévêque (2012); they
overlap considerably and so are shown as a single range. Finally, we compare solar PV the elicitation data with
seven studies, covering different periods and lengths of time and showing very different cost reduction rates. The
IEA studies span 2010 to 2035; they include global module prices and include both historical and prospective
components (IEA 2014). Fraunhofer (2015) covers historical data of solar PV prices in Germany.
Overall, there appears to be a relationship between past experience and experts’ beliefs. Technologies with the
biggest past decreases have medians farthest to the left, whereas nuclear, with past increases, has medians
farthest to the right. However, the technologies differ in the degree to which the experts see the future as being
similar to the past. The elicitations for biofuels indicate median rates of change very similar to that seen
historically. While the experts are not terribly optimistic about nuclear, putting the median rate of change near
zero, they are nevertheless more optimistic than past data would imply, as nuclear has shown primarily cost
increases in the past. This may reflect optimism, or it may be a sign that experts believe that current research,
modelling, and licensing practices make it less likely for costs to continue to increase in the future. Note that most
of the nuclear elicitations overlap with the historical data, and thus, continued increases would not be a surprise.
The experts appear to expect a significant slowdown in the rate of change of bioelectricity costs, at least when
compared to the experience from Sweden. The figure indicates that only the UMass experts foresaw a reasonable
chance of continuing to achieve such rapid cost decreases. This indicates either (1) the experts in the studies
believe that much of the cost reduction has been achieved; or (2) the experts in the study were over-confident
and did not account for the kind of rapid cost reduction that was recently seen in Sweden. Solar is of particular
interest. The band of color on the far left indicates a recent significant annual cost decreases over a short period
of time. The experts appear to believe, however, that in the long term, the annual decrease rate will be, on
average, similar to what it has been over longer historical periods and estimated by Fraunhofer and IEA. This is
consistent with statistical expectations in general: it is not unusual to have an outlier over a short period of time
(such as between 2010 and 2014 in the Fraunhofer estimate), but experts seem to expect future changes to have
some reversion to the mean. Again, there are two interpretations. First, it is possible that experts in the
elicitations missed a fundamental change to the trajectory of costs that started in 2010 and will continue; this is a
real possibility since most of the elicitations took place before 2010 when prices started falling rapidly. Second, an
alternative interpretation is that the experts correctly estimated the long term trajectory of solar, with the short
term rapid reductions in cost not indicating a change in the trajectory, but rather simply a random deviation. The
three IEA forecasts overlap with most of the medians of the expert elicitations, but do not provide information
about the range of outcomes around the median.
This comparison informs on the value of elicitations in combination with past data. Elicitations are able to provide
insights about the range of possibilities, meaning that there will be far fewer surprises than when decisions are
based on historical estimates. Elicitations, such as these, can include the impact of prospective policies, and can
consider deviations in rates of technological change that may be enabled by new scientific developments; it is
difficult or impossible to get this information from past data. Past data and elicitations together can be
particularly revealing. When compared, they can tell us when experts think the future will be different from past;
this information can be further explored and considered in policy decisions.

4 Future research needs and conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of existing expert elicitation studies on the future of energy
technologies with a focus on the impact of RD&D investments. Understanding the future performance of energy
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technologies, and how those may be affected by RD&D, is key to the design of energy RD&D portfolios and to the
development of better projections of the costs of future emissions scenarios. Although looking at past
performances of R&D programs and at the evolution of technological costs is a key input to the process of
designing careful strategies for the future, this data may, by itself, not make the best use of all information
available to anticipate unexpected and unprecedented patterns due to characteristics that may be technology
specific or related to unprecedented phases in the boundary conditions. For these reasons, expert elicitations are
an important, and complementary, source of information.
Taken all together, the expert elicitation data summarized here show some regularities. Most simply, experts
largely believe that increased public R&D investments will result in reductions in future technology costs by 2030,
although possibly with diminishing marginal returns. Implicit median annual rates in cost reduction collected
through expert elicitations partly reflect historical trends in those technologies. However, the information
collected is much richer and allows us to look into the extremes of the tails (breakthroughs and failures) thus
allowing the design of more robust policies. For all technologies, experts see the possibility of breakthroughs that
would make the technology cost competitive, envisioning sustained annual rates of cost reduction on the order of
10% per year. These tails seem to be more extreme under higher R&D; it is more difficult to say what would
happen under decreased funding. The range of uncertainty and disagreement among the technologies and teams
seems to imply that there are benefits in a portfolio approach to technology R&D, rather than picking a small
number of winners (Anadón et al. 2015). However, it is important to note that any improvements in technology
must be evaluated in the context of the economy before decisions about R&D investment are made.
In general, many results differ substantially across studies. This finding, corroborated by three meta-analysis
studies, indicates that differences in elicitation design (including choice of experts, mode of elicitation, and format
of the questions) may lead to differences in estimates. In order to extract the full value of these elicitations, it is
important to explore the role of key features in elicitation design, perhaps experimentally, and to bring these
lessons to practice in the design of shared protocols that allow a more systematic collection of data. As the cost of
elicitation can be very high, a possible way forward would be to design web-based protocols that maximize the
effectiveness of the elicitation while allowing repeated communication with experts as well as the participation of
a broader set of experts.
A few important gaps in the literature emerge from this overview. First, although many studies conditioned on
current or increased RD&D investments, very few (considered drastic reductions in current RD&D spending Jenni
et al. 2013; Fiorese et al. 2014; Ricci et al. 2014; NRC 2007 are exceptions). In times of tight governmental
budgets, it is important to assess what would happen if entire RD&D programs were scaled down. Second, as the
geography of experts appears to be a key driver of elicited costs, and given that energy RD&D investments data
show an increasing role for emerging economies, it will be important to extend expert elicitations to include
experts from emerging economies to obtain a more exhaustive picture of how technologies might progress.
Third, some technology areas, such as utility scale energy storage, wind, vehicles, gas turbines, geothermal and
energy efficiency technologies, have been the subject of few, or no, publicly available expert elicitations. As a
result, our ability to analyze these technologies and how they fit into energy RD&D portfolios is limited,
particularly given insights presented on some of the drivers of the estimates.
Overall, the recent emergence of data on future energy costs through expert elicitations is providing the
opportunity and (we would argue) the obligation of more rigorously and transparently introducing considerations
of uncertainty around technical change on discussions about energy policies and climate change mitigation. We
believe this is essential given the magnitude of the uncertainties involved and their impact on costs. The elicited
probabilistic information summarized in this paper sheds light on where technological progress is most likely, and
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how it is influenced by public RD&D efforts. Expert elicitation data can serve as input to the calibration of
integrated assessment and energy system models that are commonly used to design and evaluate energy and
climate policies. Finally, it can be used in more complex analyses aiming at the definition of energy RD&D
portfolios that account for multiple societal objectives and that are robust to key uncertainties affecting the
innovation process.
In the spirit of the suggestions by Convery and Wagner (2015), this review provides an up to date summary of
what we know, and what we do not know, about the future of technological progress in energy and how it is
influenced by public RD&D efforts. While scientists and economists are often more comfortable with point
estimates derived from past data, this work shows that the uncertainty about the future is much wider than can
be derived from past data, and that surprises, both happy and unhappy, are real possibilities that need to be
accounted for. The presence of multiple studies covering similar technologies underlines that representing
uncertainty is a complex task, one in which insights can most certainly be drawn, but where humility is a
necessary trait.
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Appendix A: Individual Survey Data
In all following graphs, when one expert elicited more than one specific sub-technology category, the values for
that expert were aggregated. The aggregation was carried out taking the minimum of the 10th percentile, the
median of the 50th percentile and the maximum of the 90th percentile.

Harmonized surveys

Figure 1: Experts’ results of the bioelectricity surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to
the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

1

Figure 2: Experts’ results of the biofuel surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to the 90th
percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

2

Figure 3: Experts’ results of the CCS surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to the 90th
percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

3

Figure 4: Experts’ results of the nuclear GenIII/III+ surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th
to the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

4

Figure 5: Experts’ results of the nuclear GenIV surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to
the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

5

Figure 6: Experts’ results of the nuclear SMR surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to the
90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

6

Figure 7: Experts’ results of the PV surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to the 90th
percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

7

Figure 8: Experts’ results of the CPV surveys per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to the 90th
percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

8

Individual experts non harmonized surveys

CCS

Figure 9: Experts’ results of the UMass (Jenni et al 2013a) CCS survey per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range
from the 10th to the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

9

Figure 10: Experts’ results of FEEM CCS survey per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to the 90th
percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile. R&D level 1 corresponds to no further R&D for the
specific capture technology is funded by the EU; R&D level 2 is as level 1 but some type of carbon price is enacted
worldwide, beginning in 2015 (assumes that whatever form the policy takes, it has the effect of about a $100/tonCO2
Carbon Tax worldwide); R&D level 3 assumes that the EU increases investments in a specific capture technology R&D
substantially, to about $250 million per year, starting in 2015 and continuing at that level through to 2025. (Consider that
since 2002 annual R&D investments for capture technologies in the EU have ranged between 0.6-111.0 Million 2010US$,
with an average of 41.6 Million 2010US$).
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Vehicles

Figure 11: Experts’ results of the FEEM vehicle batteries survey per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the
10th to the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

11

Figure 12: Experts’ results of the Harvard vehicles survey per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th
to the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.
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Utility Energy Storage

Figure 13: Experts’ results of the Harvard storage survey per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines range from the 10th to
the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.

13

Natural Gas

Figure 14: Experts’ results of the Stanford (Bistline 2013) natural gas survey per expert and per R&D scenario. The lines
range from the 10th to the 90th percentiles and the marker in between represents the 50th percentile.
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Appendix B. Data Standardization Process
As noted in the appendix of Anadón et al. (2015): “In order to compare and aggregate the values that were
elicited in the individual surveys, a set of harmonizing assumptions had to be made to allow a meaningful
comparison. For each of the assumptions that differ across studies (i.e., as currencies and currency years, endpoint
years, and other underlying technical factors) we had to make a decision on what value to converge to. The
harmonization process per se required months of research and discussions between the authors of the different
elicitation studies”. This Appendix briefly summarizes the data cleaning and harmonization procedures. We refer
the interested reader to the original articles (Anadón et al 2013; Anadón et al.2015; Baker et al. 2015; Verdolini et
al. 2015; Nemet, et al 2016) for further details. This Appendix borrows heavily from the Appendices and
explanations included in these articles. First, whenever elicitation groups collected different metrics, the
harmonization process entailed constructing a model to make the data comparable using common assumptions
(e.g., insolation and discount rates). Details in this respect are explained below in subsection B.1 and organized by
technology (Nemet el al. 2016). Second, all surveys included in the harmonization procedure elicited costs in
2030, with the exception of the UMass studies, which asked experts about 2050. The explanation of how UMass
elicited values were adjusted is presented in subsection B.2. Third, harmonization of the R&D levels is discussed in
subection B.3.

Section B.1: Harmonization of cost estimates
As argued in Section 2 of the paper, differences among studies make it challenging to compare the results of the
expert elicitations. For instance, it is impossible to gather insights on the impacts of RD&D investment levels
across the different studies if the elicited metrics are different. To address the issue of data comparability across
different energy technology expert elicitations, a set of papers performed a standardization process on a subset
of the studies listed in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. (Anadón et al 2013, Baker et al. 2015a;
Verdolini et al. 2015; Nemet et al. 2016). We summarize here the main aspects of the standardization process.
Details on the standardization of the budget amounts with which experts were confronted are discussed in
Appendix C.
First, all elicited values were transformed in the common metric of 2010$/kWh using common assumptions (e.g.,
insolation and discount rates). This common metric represented an LCOE for solar photovoltaics, a non-energy
LCOE for bioelectricity, a non-energy levelized cost of fuel for biofuels, a partial levelized cost of electricity for
nuclear (including only capital cost), and a levelized additional cost of CCS. Harmonization assumptions are
detailed below for each technology and study. Table B.1 below was compiled using information from Anadón et
al (2013); Anadón et al. (2015); Baker et al. (2015); Verdolini et al. (2015); Nemet et al (2016) and summarizes the
elicited values and key assumptions for the UMass, Harvard, CMU and FEEM harmonized studies.
Another aspect is that different elicitation studies use different levels of granularity in the assessed technologies
(e.g. general CCS versus absorption) and metrics. This was addressed by identifying the level of technology
granularity that allowed for the largest number of elicitations, generally the most-aggregated level. For example,
some nuclear surveys focused on collecting information on the most commercially-viable large-scale Gen. IV
nuclear system and its future cost, while others focused on specific reactor configurations such as fast reactors
and high temperature reactors. When experts provided cost estimates for different sub-technologies, only the
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lowest cost sub-technology estimate is used, assuming that this would be the technology that would be most
successful in the economy.
Table B1. Summary of key assumptions in harmonization process (Nemet et al. 2016)
Group

Biofuels
Ca pi tal cos t per gge
(ga l l on of ga s ol i ne
equi va l ent), ca pa ci ty,
Cos t per gge

Bioelectricity

CCS

Nuclear

Va ri ous techni ca l
endpoi nts

Va ri ous techni ca l
endpoi nts

Va ri ous techni ca l
endpoi nts

Ma nufa cturi ng cos t per m2

Cos t per kwh

N/A

Overni ght ca pi tal

LCOE

metrics elicited

O&M cos t

O&M cos t

Harvard

Cos t per gge

Cos t per kwh

Overni ght ca pi tal cos t ($/kW)
Overni ght ca pi tal cos t ($/kW)
Modul e ca pi tal cos t per Wp

metrics elicited

Pl a nt l i fe
yi el d (gge/dry ton
feeds tock)
feeds tock cos ts

Pl a nt l i fe
yi el d (gge/dry ton
feeds tock)

Genera ting effi ci ency

Fi xed O\M cos t

Modul e effi ci ency

HHV

Va ri a bl e O\M cos t

Inverter cos t

Ca pa ci ty fa ctor

Fuel cos t

Inverter effi ci ency

Book l i fe

Therma l burnup

Inverter l i fetime

N/A

N/A

N/A

Overni ght ca pi tal cos t

Modul e pri ces i n $/W for

UMass
metrics elicited
FEEM

CMU

Solar

effi ci ency l i fetime

cos t

metrics elicited

di fferent s ol a r s ys tems

Common Metrics Non-energy l evel i zed
Harmonized
cos t of fuel

Non-energy LCOE

Key

0.031 kwh=1gge

Assumptions

See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions
needed to turn UMa s s
2050 es tima tes to 2030
es tima tes

See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions
needed to turn UMa s s
2050 es tima tes to 2030
es tima tes

See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions
needed to turn UMa s s
2050 es tima tes to 2030
es tima tes

See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions
needed to turn UMa s s
2050 es tima tes to 2030
es tima tes

Level i zed ca pi tal cos t

Level i zed ca pi tal cos t

LCOE

Interes t Ra te=0.1

Interes t Ra te=0.1

Ca pa ci ty Fa ctor: 12%

Li fetime=40

Li fetime=40

Fa ctor Di s count ra te: 10%

Ca pa ci ty Fa ctor=0.9

Hours per yea r: 8760

See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions
needed to turn UMa s s
2050 es tima tes to 2030
es tima tes

See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions
needed to turn UMa s s
2050 es tima tes to 2030
es tima tes

Li fetime: 20
BOS m2: 75 UMa s s , 250
Ha rva rd
Cos t of Power Cond ($/Wp):
0.1
Moduel Area Cos ts ($/m2):
350
Pea k Power Ins ol a tion
(Wp/m2): 1,000
See des cri ption bel ow
a bout a s s umptions needed
to turn UMa s s 2050
es tima tes to 2030 es tima tes
For CMU s ol a r, Modul e
pri ces $/W were converted
i nto LCOE $/kWh us i ng the
a vera ge va l ues from the
Ha rva rd s tudy for the other
cos t components a nd BOS
a s wel l a s other
a s s umptions a bove

Section B.2 Temporal harmonization of UMass data
As explained in Anadón et al. (2015): “In order to adjust the UMass endpoints from 2050 to 2030, which was the
time frame used in the FEEM and Harvard studies, we backcasted the UMass 2050 estimates to 2030 using
Moore's Law and parameters from Nagy et al. (2013). Nagy et al. (2013) analyzed a large dataset for several
technologies, and concluded that the estimated costs that used only the parameter time performed
approximately as well as the traditional experience curve. Thus, we use the following relation based on Moore's
Law:
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Where m is a parameter of this model calculated from B, the learning rate, and g, the growth rate of production,
as follows.
This method is used to estimate the values for 2030:
The parameter m is calculated using the learning parameters B, taken from the literature, and the growth
parameter g provided in Nagy et al. (2013). A summary for all technologies is reported in Table B.2.

Table B.2. reprinted with permission from Baker et al 2014(a)

Section B.3: RD&D investment assumptions in expert elicitation and harmonization of
R&D levels
Twenty-four of the studies reviewed here specifically conditioned on RD&D funding scenarios. As noted in
appendix of Anadón et al. (2015), the UMass, Harvard and FEEM experts were confronted with different R&D
scenarios as explained below: “Experts were asked to assess future costs and performance of energy
technologies, for three given levels of R&D funding by governments in order to study the effect of government
R&D on reducing the costs of clean energy technologies. Each team defined R&D funding levels differently. […]
funding levels are grouped into three broad categories, Low (which is consistent with a business-as-usual (BAU)
scenario for FEEM, an increase of 50% to 200% over BAU for Harvard, and small investments, independent from
the BAU, into specific technologies for UMass), Medium (ranging between an additional 50% to a 16-fold increase
over low) and High (ranging between an additional 30% to a 10-fold increase over medium). And, while both
Harvard and FEEM included demonstration expenditures, UMass asked questions about smaller R&D scenarios
that did not include demonstration expenditures.
The CMU nuclear cost elicitation made R&D assumptions consistent with a BAU scenario (Low R&D). Conversely,
the solar CMU study made assumptions about both R&D investment and specific deployment levels. Specifically,
experts were asked for their estimates under four scenarios:
a)
Status quo, defined as 2008 government RD&D funding levels for the PV technology being considered and
current government incentive levels for deployment of PV technologies in general;
b)
10x RD, defined as 10 times the 2008 RD&D level
c)
10X deploy, defined as a 2008 RD&D investment level, accompanied by a 10-fold increase in deployment
in the United States
d)
10X deploy and 10X RD&D, defined as a combination of scenarios (b) and (c).
Scenario (a) was categories as “low” RD&D and elicitations, while scenarios (b) as “high” RD&D. Data for
scenarios c and d were not used.
Table 3 summarizes the details of the assumptions about RD&D funding scenarios for the studies which
underwent the standardization process described in Section 2.
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Table B.1: RD&D levels in expert elicitations
RD&D Level (million 2010$)
Group

Low

Medium

UMass

15

Harvard

BAU: 214

FEEM

169

UMass

13

Harvard

BAU: 214

FEEM

168

UMass

13

Harvard

BAU: 701

CMU

BAU

UMass

40

Harvard

BAU: 466

FEEM

BAU: 800

CMU

BAU: 466

Umass

25

Harvard

BAU: 143

FEEM

171

140
Ave. REC RD&D
(409)
257

CMU

BAU

10 BAU

High

10 REC RD&D

201
Ave. REC RD&D
(585)
252

10 REC RD&D

0.5 REC RD&D

Includes biofuels budget

0.5 REC RD&D

(includes bioelectricity budget)

338
Biofuel
838

336
Carbon Capture and Storage
108
10 REC

0.5 REC

includes coal and gas CCS budget

Deployment
scenarios

10 BAU
480
Ave. REC RD&D
(1,883)
Ave. REC RD&D
(1,514)

Comments

Bioelectricity
150

50
Ave. REC RD&D
(585)
254

48
Ave. REC RD&D
(2,250)

Excluded from
present study

Nuclear power
1980
10 REC

0.5 REC

10 REC

0.5 REC

(includes Gen III+ and IV, both largescale and SMRs)
(includes Gen III+ and IV, both largescale and SMRs)
No explicit assumptions on RD&D,
but consistent with BAU RD&D
budget.

Solar power
10X REC

0.5X REC

342
Deployment
scenarios

Section B.4. Quantitative analysis of results from multiple elicitations
We now summarize the results of three studies which investigated the impact of study design on the outcomes of
expert elicitations, using the standardized data from a subset of the expert elicitations presented above. As
discussed in Section 2, differences in the protocol design (i.e., metrics, target year, mode, RD&D scenarios) and
the background and geographic area of the experts make it difficult to draw insights through a simple
juxtaposition of elicited cost estimates.
Anadón et al (2013); Verdolini et al. (2015); Nemet et al. (2016) use a meta-analytic approach to test whether
expert or survey characteristics, including assumptions about technology granularity and R&D levels, impact
elicited values in a statistically significant way. The three papers use similar methods, but cover different sets of
studies: Anadón et al. (2013) focus on nuclear power, Verdolini et al. (2015) on solar PV, and Nemet et al. (2016)
pulls together 16 surveys on five energy technologies (solar, nuclear, biofuels, bioelectricity and coal with CCS).
The studies investigate two sets of independent variables: percentiles (10th, 50th, and 90th representing “bestcase/breakthrough scenario,” median expected future costs and “worst case scenario”) and a normalized
measure of the range of uncertainty. The four key categories of variables included: (1) technology characteristics,
18

(2) R&D levels, (3) expert characteristics (sectoral background and geographic area), and (4) study characteristics
(elicitation mode, year of elicitation, whether elicitation was published in a peer-reviewed journal).
Overall, the three studies provide strong indication that: public RD&D investment has an impact on elicited costs,
both at the median and at the extremes of the distribution. Such impact is, however, technology specific in that
the returns to RD&D investment differ by technology in a significant way. This reflects different technological
maturity and perceived cost-reduction options. Conversely, the level of public RD&D investment considered does
not generally affect the uncertainty range of elicited costs. In a number of cases, expert background and
geographic location are associated with lower or higher cost estimates, but this effect is technology specific and
cannot be generalized. This probably reflects the experience of experts with a given technology. It also raises the
issue of selecting experts from different backgrounds to capture a wider variation in elicited costs. In-person
surveys are associated with broader uncertainty ranges. This suggests that current online methods are not as
good as an interviewer in getting experts to think more broadly. While it would be ideal to explore these findings
further within an experimental design in which only one variable is changing at a time, they provide initial
evidence that elicitation design impacts the elicited metrics.
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Appendix C. Energy RD&D Investments
In this section, we present an overview of historical energy RD&D budget levels and allocations globally by public
and private actors, and of experts’ future looking recommendations about public U.S. energy RD&D levels and
allocation.

Section C.1. Sources of Public and Private RD&D data
There are two main sources of information on public energy technology RD&D budgets for developed countries.
The International Energy Agency collects RD&D Budget/Expenditure Statistics for 29 IEA Member countries for
several large technology categories: energy efficiency; fossil fuels; renewable energy sources; nuclear fission and
fusion; Hydrogen and fuel cells; other power and storage techs; Total other cross-cutting technologies or
research.1 Data includes both budgeted and expenditure amounts, and is generally available starting in the 1980s.
More granular information on the allocation of RD&D within each technologies (for instance, for the categories of
“solar heating and cooling,” “PV,” “solar thermal power and high-temperature applications,” and “unallocated
solar energy” within solar energy more in general) has become available only recently and not for all countries.
Statistics on energy-related public RD&D budgets (but not expenditures) are also collected as part of the GBAORD
database by EUROSTAT and the OECD (OECD 2016). Statistics include government-funded RD&D performed in
government establishments but also government-financed RD&D in the other sectors (business enterprise,
private non-profit, higher education) as well as abroad (including international organizations) and are collected
under different socio-economic objective (SEO).2 One of the 13 SEOs of public RD&D funding is “Production,
Distribution and Rational Utilization of Energy”, which also includes research on processes designed to increase
the efficiency of energy production and distribution, and the study of energy conservation.
In addition to these public efforts in funding energy R&D, private investments also have a crucial role, although
information on private energy R&D investments is rather poor. The few available data sources in this respect offer
a partial picture of private investments in the broad category of energy technologies. The comprehensiveness of
data on private RD&D in electricity generation technologies, especially renewables, is relatively good. Conversely,
information on other technologies, such as vehicles and batteries, is very limited.
The data sources reporting the level of private energy RD&D investments in developed countries include:
-

1

The US National Science Foundation Industrial Surveys (the BRDIS – Business Research and Development
and Innovation Survey, NSF 2015), described in Anadón et al. 2014. Before 2008, BRDIS had 3 broad

Countries covered include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Iceland, Chile, and Mexico
are OECD members, but are not IEA members. For further details see (IEA 2015).
2
The SEOs are based on the Nomenclature for the Analysis and comparison of Scientific programs and Budget (NABS) 2007
classification. These include Exploration and exploitation of the earth, Infrastructure and general planning of land-use,
Control and care of the environment, Protection and improvement of human health, Production, distribution and rational
utilization of energy, Agricultural production and technology, Industrial production and technology, Social structures and
relationships, Exploration and exploitation of space, Research financed from GUF, Non-oriented research, Other civil
research, Defense.
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-

-

-

technology classes (nuclear energy, fossil energy and all other) and only covered about 100 large firms.
After 2008 it covered over 11,000 firms, and provided a clear definition of “energy”, but it did not provide
results disaggregated by technology area. Data is available since 2000, and the most recent available
estimate (2010) from this sources indicates private energy R&D investments in the United States for over
$16 billion in 2010$ for a total of 11,557 firms.
The EU Joint Research Center (Wiesenthal et al. 2012), which estimates private investments in
technologies that are part of the Strategic Energy Technology Plan for the year 2007. The SET Plan
technologies include wind energy, photovoltaics (PV) and concentrating solar power (CSP), CCS, biofuels,
hydrogen and fuel cells, smart grids, nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion. Wiesenthal et al. (2012) use a
bottom up approach refining basic data on individual companies taken from the EU Industrial RD&D
Investment Scoreboard and companies’ annual reports with other publicly available data and direct
contacts with individual enterprises and. Information details totals by technology and country, but not
firm counts. Using this methodology, they estimate that corporate R&D in 2007 for non-nuclear
technology areas was around €1.66 billion €2007, with a margin of error of 24%. Given the broader
definition of energy R&D used in the NSF BRDIS survey, the EU and US numbers presented are not
comparable.
The JRC-IPTS Scoreboard which contains information on corporate R&D financed by the top 1400 EU and
non EU firms. R&D expenditures are allocated to the parent company, thus effectively assigning all the
R&D investment to the country where the parent company is located, independently of where the actual
R&D expenditure took place. A focus on the power sector is available for the time period 2007- 2010,
where the sectors Electricity, Gas, water & multi-utilities, and Alternative energy are defined. However,
some firms reported in the Scoreboard and that perform R&D relevant to the power sector are classified
elsewhere, as their main product segment is not power generation. For example, the Japanese Company
Hitachi Kokusai Electric is classified under the Electronic equipment sector, but it sells most of its products
(69% of total sales) to the power sector. General Electric, which according to the ICB classification
standards falls under General Industries, perform research in many areas closely connected to power
generation such as wind turbines and sells 9% of its products to the power sector.
The OECD ANBERD Database (BERD) database, which is a source of information on sectoral RD&D
expenditure performed. Within the database, expenditures for the sector “Electricity, water and gas
distribution industry” sector are detailed. There are two main challenges in using the ANBERD data. First,
the statistics are presented by sector of performance expenditures regardless of whether funding was
sourced from private or public spending, and expenditures by large energy authorities are frequently
classified in the service sector and this can distort the international comparison at the industrial level.
Second, the sector “Electricity, water and gas distribution industry” is clearly not capturing in a
satisfactory way the R&D expenditure related to power production and distribution, as much of it is
carried out in other sectors such as mining and machinery which provide capital and material inputs to
energy production.

Both public and private energy RD&D data in middle- and low-income countries is also hard to find, since it is
not compiled systematically. A recent Harvard study showed that middle- and low-income countries’
investments in energy technology R&D are however becoming sizeable and must be taken into account in an
effort to think about the future evolution of technologies. Kempener et al. (2010) and Kempener et al. (2014)
present data for the each of the BRIMCS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico and South Africa) for one year
into categories compatible with the IEA technology categorization. Kempener et al (2010) show estimates for
2008 of at least $13.8 billion 2008$ PPP (an estimate that includes funding from state owned enterprises
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where the government has a majority stake). The data are only available namely: fossil (including CCS),
nuclear, electricity, transmission, distribution and storage, renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and
other. The “at least” caveat mentioned above is important because there were many categories for which
data was not available for a particular country, which does not mean that there was no expenditure in the
area. In the same year, governments in IEA member countries reported investing $12.7 billion 2008$ PPP.
Recently, the Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF 2014) started collecting data on renewable energy
investments globally. These include not only public and private RD&D expenditures, but also information on
venture capital, private equity, asset finance focusing on energy technologies. The Frankfurt School, UNEP,
and Bloomberg New Energy Finance used this information to publish a yearly report on energy investment
with global coverage since 2010. While including information on key developing countries, the data only
covers renewable power and fuels (thus, it does not include, for example, vehicles, efficiency, nuclear, or
CCS). Other major limitations of this data source are that the number and size of the firms included in the
estimates are not specified, that it is unclear how the renewables R&D budget for big corporations active in
both energy and non-energy technology areas is determined, and what the criteria are for including firms.
Nonetheless, this source indicates a budget of $5 billion 2014$ in corporate RD&D in renewables in 2013,
which, according to their estimates, is roughly the same size as the amount of government R&D for clean
energy.

Section C.2. Past RD&D investments
A clear understanding of the magnitude and impact of past energy RD&D would help towards designing robust
RD&D investments portfolios. Unfortunately, there is a pervasive lack of data compounded by difficulties in
attributing technological change to individual causes; this has made it difficult to assess the effectiveness of public
RD&D investments. As evident from Table 2, it is extremely hard to grasp the magnitude of energy-related RD&D
investments from these different data sources. Estimates are not comparable across different sources given
differences in the technologies considered, the methodologies used to collect data (budget versus expenses,
whether the data is allocated to parent company in the home country or in the country where it is spent, etc.).
Furthermore, insights on the trends in energy-related RD&D expenditures are hard to draw given the lack of timeseries data, with the exception of public investments in OECD countries reported by the IEA. The USA and Europe
lead in terms of investments. However, fast-developing countries are increasing their investments, with China
doing so at an impressive rate (Anadón 2012).
Table C.2 provides information on public and private RD&D investments from several of the sources described in
Section C.1 above. As evident from the table, it is extremely hard to grasp the magnitude of energy-related RD&D
investments from these different data sources. Estimates are not comparable across different sources given
differences in the technologies considered, the methodologies used to collect data (budget versus expenses,
whether the data is allocated to parent company in the home country or in the country where it is spent, etc.).
Furthermore, insights on the trends in energy-related RD&D expenditures are hard to draw given the lack of timeseries data, with the exception of public investments in OECD countries reported by the IEA. The USA and Europe
lead in terms of investments. However, fast-developing countries are increasing their investments, with China
doing so at an impressive rate (Anadón 2012).
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Table C.2: Energy RD&D investments by country (or region), public and private, various sources, 2010USD.
Country

Source
BNEF (2012)

Source
Corporate R&D

Kempener et al. (2010) Government R&D
Brazil

Kempener et al. (2010) Other

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

9

9

19

47

38

47

38

38

65

69

90

102

80

603

755

1,208

1,256

1,182

304

437

304

47

45

67

47

15

BNEF (2012)

Renewable energy
Fossil energy
(incl.CCS)
Fossil energy
(incl.CCS)

19

19

28

85

19

3,545

3,810

4,646

5,614

6,844

41

56

47

106

293

11

12

12

20

22

31

38

41

8

15

24

23

31

20

20

23

364
244

487
264

559
291

676
323

733
309

1,082
377

1,282
425

Energy

2,191

2,656

2,687

3,101

3,875

3,770

3,960

3,827

Renewable energy
non nuclear SET Plan

1,083

712

883

703

1,102

1,216

1,339

921

57

57

38

Corporate R&D

Kempener et al. (2010) Government R&D
Binz et al. (2015)
Binz et al. (2015)
IEA (2016)
IEA (2016)
OECD (2016)
BNEF (2012)
Wiesenthal et al.
(2012b)
BNEF (2012)

Renewable energy

Special Programs
relevant for Energy
Special Programs
relevant for Energy

energy expenditure of
973 project
energy expenditure of
Gongguan project

Government R&D
Government R&D
Government R&D
(Federal budget)
Corporate R&D

Renewable energy
Fossil Fuels

Corporate R&D
Corporate R&D

Kempener et al. (2010) Government R&D
India

2004

Renewable energy

Kempener et al. (2010) Other

Europe*

Renewable energy
Fossil energy
(incl.CCS)
Fossil energy
(incl.CCS)

1

Kempener et al. (2010) Government R&D

Kempener et al. (2010) Government R&D

China

Technology

Kempener et al. (2010) Other

2,312

Technologies2
Renewable energy
Fossil energy
(incl.CCS)
Fossil energy
(incl.CCS)

0

0

9

9

28

148

97

311

188

107

2,420

1,585

566

1,396

703

Kempener et al. (2010) Government R&D

Renewable energy

39

18

31

46

58

IEA (2016)
IEA (2016)

Renewable energy
Fossil Fuels

272
483

272
436

214
435

571
464

451
569

2,202
3,351

454

1,578

1,478

1,347

2,027

2,148

3,895

2,607

2,251

959

883

1,007

978

16,107

16,482

16,477

OECD (2016)
United
States

Government R&D
Government R&D
Government R&D
(Federal)
Corporate R&D

Energy

BNEF (2012)
Renewable energy
2,184
712
826
722
Jones et al (2014) - NSF
Private RD&D
2,429
2,934
4,206
5,671
SIRD
Energy applications3
Jones et al (2014) Private RD&D
BRDIS
Energy applications3
* EUROPE refers to the EU27. Note that IEA and OECD do not collect data for some of the EU27 (see sources for details)
1

Biofuels, Biomass & Waste, Geothermal, Marine, Small Hydro, Solar, Wind

2

Inxcludes fuels cells and smar grids

3

Energy applications, including energy production, distribution, storage, and efficiency (excluding exploration and prospecting). Energy R&D in industry from
the NSF SIRD survey (from 2000 to 2007) and the BRDIS survey (for 2008-2010).

As argued in Section 3 of the paper, there are number of reports and assessments that analyze specific case
studies, of, concluding that public energy RD&D investments have played a major role in cost and performance
improvements.
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Section C.3. RD&D Budgets in Energy Elicitations
Most of the elicitation studies listed in Table 1 considered multiple levels of RD&D funding to prompt experts to
think about both business-as-usual and extreme funding scenarios. Four studies – Jenni et al 2013, Ricci et al 2014
and two NRC studies -- explicitly considered a “No RD&D” scenario. Many studies defined budgets based on
multiples of current governmental RD&D budgets, including the FEEM studies (EU budgets); Curtright et al. (2008)
and Chung et al (2011) (US budgets); the NRC studies, Jenni et al. (2013) (USDOE budgets). Rao et al. (2006) only
specified “modest but steady growth” of the current DOE budget.
The UMass studies developed budget amounts in a bottom-up manner in conjunction with a subset of the experts
for each sub-technology (e.g. purely organic solar cells, post-combustion CCS). These budgets did not include
demonstration plants, and were primarily aimed at inducing scientific breakthroughs that would enable better
technologies. The Harvard studies asked experts to develop a recommendation in a bottom-up fashion by
allocating funding amounts to specific research areas within a technology, and to cover the spectrum from basic
RD&D, applied RD&D, and demonstration plants. They then made assessments conditional four RD&D scenarios:
BAU, and ½X, 1X, and 10X their recommended budget. Figure 15, sourced from Anadón et al (2014a), displays the
median, minimum and maximum amount of recommended RD&D budgets by technology area, and compares it to
the 2009 and 2015 U.S. Department of Energy funding allocations (see also Table ES-1 in Anadón et al 2011).
Overall, Harvard experts recommended increasing public RD&D funding for specific technology on average by a
factor of 2.5 (for fossil, solar, and bioenergy) to about 11 (for energy storage).
Figure 15: Recommended budgets from the Harvard studies per expert and technology.

Source: Anadón et al (2014a), Transforming US Energy Innovation, page 118, Figure 2.5. The figure presents range
of budget recommendations from experts, by technology area. The red line represents the median
recommendation; the blue box encompasses the 25th and 75 percentiles; the black lines represent the highest and
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lowest recommendations within 1.5 times the interquantile range of budget recommendations. The
recommendations outside this range are show with cross marks.

Section C.4. Expert recommendations on funding allocation by technology and types
of RD&D
Some elicitations asked experts to provide a recommended allocation of the RD&D funds for a particular
technology area across different technological paths or focus areas explored in the elicitation (e.g. how much to
allocate to enzymatic hydrolysis or thermochemical conversion processes, among other areas, in the biofuels
survey). In general, experts indicate that more than one sub-technological path should be explored and pursued
within each technology (see for instance the discussion in Bosetti et al. 2012 and Anadón et al. 2014a). The
highest allocations for more specific technology areas within each energy technology for the Harvard elicitations
were for thermochemical conversion processes (pyrolysis and liquefaction) in bioenergy; oxy-fueling and IGCC in
fossil and CCS; SFR (Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors) and fuel cycle for nuclear; thin films and concentrators for
solar; Li-ion batteries for vehicles; and batteries and flow batteries for utility-scale storage. For the FEEM studies,
thermochemical conversion process received roughly 27 percent of the biomass technology budget, Li-ion
batteries 28 percent of the storage for electric vehicles budget, Algae about 14 percent of the budget for biofuelrelated RD&D, and Crystalline-Si and Thin-film PV roughly 20 percent each of the solar RD&D public budget
In a related question, the Harvard and FEEM surveys asked experts to allocate funding for specific pathways
across different “types” of research, namely: basic research, applied research, pilots and experiments as well as
demonstration. Figure 16 shows the breakdown of the budget in the four different types of RD&D by technology
for both the Harvard and FEEM studies. To provide a benchmark, the fraction of federal RD&D in the United
States for all technology areas (energy and non-energy) devoted to the basic research, applied research and
development in 2011 was 32%, 24% and 44%.3 As seen in Figure 2, the emphasis varied by technology area.
Figure 16. Expert’s recommended budget allocation to different phases of RD&D process (percent of total budget by
technology)

3

Batteries

Biofuels

Solar

Nuclear

R&D Phase

Vehicles

Fossil R&D
(including CCS)

Energy Storage

Bioenergy

Nuclear

Harvard

Bioenergy

FEEM

15%

33%

20%

31%

21%

Basic Research

38%

12%

19%

20%

21%

48%

38%

38%

44%

29%

Applied Research

37%

21%

24%

22%

31%

-

-

-

-

30%

Experiments and Pilots

19%

25%

26%

29%

29%

37%

29%

42%

25%

20%

Commercial Demonstration

6%

43%

31%

29%

20%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total

Corresponding values for the EU cannot be calculated from the available government energy statistics.
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Appendix D. Current Cost of Technologies
This Appendix details the current costs used in to calculate the annual cost change rates presented in Section 5
(table D.1) and compares the annual cost decrease rates presented in section 5, Figure 3, with the parameters
estimated using Moore’s law as in Nagy et al. (2013) (Table D.2)
Table D.1: Technology LCOE in 2010 per technology and source.

Technology Group
Solar
Solar
Solar
Nuclear Energy
Nuclear Energy
Nuclear Energy
Nuclear Energy
Bioelectricity
Bioelectricity
Bioelectricity
Bioelectricity
Bioelectricity

Technology
PV
PV
PV
Nuclear
Nuclear
Nuclear
Nuclear
electricity biomass
electricity biomass
electricity biomass
electricity biomass
electricity biomass

Bioelectricity

Biomass gasifier

Bioelectricity

Biomass power

Bioelectricity
Nuclear Energy

PV
Nuclear

CCS

CCS

Biofuel

Gasoline substitute

Biofuel

Diesel substitute

Price in 2010
224.64
177.463
523.912
4675.35
3540
4012
3807.1
107.503
205.396
130.465
53.1
55.353

Unit
US$2005/MWh
US$2005/MWh
US$2005/MWh
$/kW
$/kW
$/kW
$/kW
US$2005/MWh
US$2005/MWh
US$2005/MWh
US$2005/MWh
US$2005/MWh

10 cUS$/kWh
12.75 cUS$/kWh
33 cUS$/kWh
4216.666667 $/kW
0.022 2009$/kWh
0.063781802 2009$/kWh
0.07681302 2009$/kWh

Source
POLES ADVANCE
REMIND 1.5
WITCH
POLES ADVANCE
REMIND 1.5
REMIND 1.6
WITCH
AIM/CGE
GCAM 3.0
POLES ADVANCE
REMIND 1.6
WITCH
REN21 Global
Status Report
Global Status
Report
Global Status
Report
IEA 2014b
Harvard CCS
survey
Harvard CCS
survey
Harvard CCS
survey

Table D.2: Linear annual cost decreases and Moore’s law estimate

Technology

Solar
Solar
Biofuel (Ethanol)
Solar
Nuclear
26

Data Source

Fraunhofer
IEA
Goldemberg
IEA
Rangel

Reference Years

2000-2014
1976-2015
1980-2002
2015-2035
1978-2002

Coefficient
from model
estimating
Moore's law
(=-m)
-0.118
-0.093
-0.059
-0.042
0.017

Ranking
based
on m
1
2
3
4
5

Nuclear

Technology

Solar
Bioelectricity
Solar
Solar
Solar
Biofuel
Biofuel
Nuclear Energy

Gruebler

1977-1999

Source

Fraunhofer 2010-2014
Juninger 1990-2002
IEA 2010-2015
Fraunhofer 2000-2014;1990-2014
Fraunhofer 2000-2010; IEA 20102035, 2014-2035
Goldemberg 1985-2002
Goldemberg 1980-1985
Rangel/Gruebler 1977-2002

Linear Annual
Cost Decrease
Rate
-0.237/-0.222
-0.126
-0.119
-0.116/-0.091
-0.062/-0.0326
-0.0582
-0.0349
0.035/0.090

0.055

6

Ranking
based on
Linear Annual
Cost Decrease
Rate
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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